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No agricultural policy issue in recent decades has generated as much
controversy as the provisions on agriculture in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade-Uruguay Round (GATT-UR) intended to "level the
playing field" in world trade. As expected, approval of those provisions
would be most difficult in developed countries that do not have a compara-
tive advantage in agriculture and whose heavy subsidies promote agricul-
tural production and even agricultural exports. GATr-UR's agricultural
provisions should be welcomed in agricultural exporting countries, particu-
larly developing countries that will benefit through greater trade opportu-
nities and higher agricultural incentives. Judging from newspaper accounts,
however, this does not appear to be the case in the Philippines, an agricul-
tural exporter. Those who are most vocal in opposing GATT-UR, i.e.,
leaders of some farmers' groups and some members of the academic
community, are ideologically against international trade. Interestingly,
those who will be potentially hurt in the short run, i.e., the sugar and poultry
sectors dominated by large producers, are not vehemently articulating their
objections. And because GATT-UR and its impact are not so easily under-
stood and its benefits are widely142 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
This paper contains three sections: The first section presents the provi-
sions of GATT-UR with respect to agriculture; in the second section, the
impact of GATT-UR on Philippine agriculture; and in the last section,
several issues with government's intended actions in connection with the
Senate ratification of GATT-UR.
It should be pointed out at the outset that the GATT-UR provisions on
agricultural trade policies are consistent with the policy reforms espoused
by local agricultural economists (Bautista 1987; Clarete 1992; David 1983,
1988, 1993; Intal and Power 1991) since the 1980s. These are --
1.overall trade liberalization to correct the overvaluation of the
peso;
2. abolition of nontariff barriers (NTBs) and substitution of
reasonable rates of taftff protection;
3. lowering of excessive trade protection that applies to a few
agricultural commodities (sugar, corn, garlic, poultry etc.);
4. elimination of direct government marketing operations; and
5. strengthening of government support services for agricul-
ture through organizational restructuring among agencies con-
cerned with agriculture, reallocating budget resources within
agriculture away from administering market interventions in favor
of increasing productivity-enhancing investments, and rationaliza-
tion of the agricultural research and development system.DAVID:GA'I-I'-URAND PHILIPPINEAGRICULTURE 143
GATT-UR PROVISIONSON AGRICULTURE
Under GATT-UR, the four major areas of commitment for agriculture are
aimed at the following:
1. Expanding market access by
• Replacing nontariffbarriers with their tariffequivalents
• Imposing ceilings (or binding) on all existing tariffs on
agricultural products at rates not more than 10 percent
of the current tariff rates
• Reducing tariffs by 36 percent over six years among
developed countries and 24 percent over 10 years
among developing countries
• Allowing aminimum level (access) of imports at atariff
lower than the initial binding tariff rate. This minimum
level of imports should be at least 1 percent of
production in 1995, rising to 4 percent of production
over 10 years.
2. Reducing distortions in agricultural production, imports, and
exports caused by production and trade-distorting domestic support
for agriculture to at most l 0 percent of the gross value of agricul-
tural production. For developed countries, such domestic support
should decrease by 20 percent over six years, and for developing
countries by 13 percent over 10 years. Public expenditures for
agricultural research, extension, irrigation, market infrastructure,
and other productivity-enhancing investments do not belong to this
category; neither do income support programs to farmers that do
not affect the levels of production and trade.
_" 3. Minimizing the international dumping of agricultural exports
by reducing the average quantity of subsidized exports and the
value of export subsidies. Developed countries must reduce quan-144 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
titlesof subsidizedexports by 21 percentandthe valueof export
subsidiesby 36percent over sixyears.Developing countriesmust
lowerquantities of subsidizedexports by 14percentandthe value
of exportsubsidiesby 24percent over 10years.
4. Removing the antitrade bias of sanitaryand phytosanitary
measures by harmonizing those measures according to interna-
tional standards, guidelines, or recommendations.Stricter regula-
tions maybeallowed basedonly on scientificjustifications.
ForthePhilippinecase,onlytheprovisionsonmarketaccessexpansion
andharmonizationofsanitaryandphytosanitarymeasuresapply.There are
no subsidies on agriculturalexports.And the country's agricultural public
expenditures that may be distorting production and trade levels such as
fertilizer subsidies,credit programs, and the i_keare much lower than the
allowable rate of 10percent ofthe value of agriculturalproduction.
Withthe harmonization of sanitaryandphytosanitary regulations,the
Philippines will, as a small country exporter of agricultural products,
undoubtedlybe protectedfrom overlyStrictregulationsintendedto restrict
trade in importing countries. For example, implementation of GATT-UR
will leadto the favorableresolutionofour protestagainstthe unnecessarily
lowmaximumacidinsolublemattercontentimposedoncarageenanimports J
byEuropeancountries thatlimitsthe growthof our exports. _
There have also been widespread objections to GATT-UR's market
access provisions in the belief that the agricultural sector, especially the
small farmers, will be adversely affected. In the next section, I argue that
the GATT-UR provisionson agriculturewill ultimatelybenefitthe Philip-
pines in general,andthe agricultural sector inparticular.
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IMPACT OF GATT-UR ON AGRICULTURE
The Philippine agricultural sector will potentially benefit from GATT-UR
throughthe policy changes thatwill be adopted by ourWadingpartners,and
the changes in our own trade policies.
Changes inDC Policies
Because of the pol!tical economy of agricultural protection, developed
countries (DCs) generally provide heavy protection or subsidies to their
agricultural sector, while developing countries (LDCs) generally tax, or at
least do not protect, their agricultural sector (Anderson and Hayami 1986;
Krueger et al. 1991; Lindert 1991). The high agricultural protection in DCs
hurts agricultural exporters by limiting access to their agricultural markets
and by lowering world prices. GATT-UR's objective of global trade liber-
alization is aimed at increasing market access worldwide and reducing
distortions in world commodity prices.
To illustrate why market access of our agricultural exports willexpand
under GATT-UR, Table I lists the reductions in tariff rates on our major
agricultural exports in Japan, the United States, and the European Union
(ELI)which together absorb nearly three-fourths of our agricultural exports.
Tariffs in these countries for the listed commodities are in general much
lower than the book tariffs of ouragricultural products. Although there may
be nontariff trade barriers (NTBs), these are to be abolished and replaced
by tariffs. The reductions in tariffs in the US and ELIare relatively small
but significant nonetheless; and for mangoes, for instance, these reductions
are substantial. Moreover, tariffs are bound at low rates, often at zero
percent. Greater reductions in tariffs (in the order of 50 percent or more)
can be observed for Japan which is the most important destination for our
agricultural exports. Indeed, under the Generalized System of Preferences,
banana exports to Japan can come in only at 10percent tariff while mangoes
are duty free.146 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE1
Changes in Tariff Ratesof Japan, US, and European Union(EU) ,-
Philippine Major Agricultural Exportsby Year 2005 under the GATT
Japan US EU
q
Cocooil From10to4.5% Bindat 0% From3 to20%
to2,5 to9,6%
Sugar From35 to 25% Tarrifyandreduce Reduceexport
by 15 % subsidy
over6 years
Bananas From40 to 20%1 Bindat0% From20 to 16%
From50 to 25%2 From3.5to0% fordriedbananas
GSP3at 10% fordriedbananas
I
Mangoes From6 to 3% From8,27cents/kg From6 to0%





Prawns From 15 to4.8% Bind at 0% Bind at 12% ,_J
Tuna4 From5 to3.5% Bindat 0% Bindat 22%





SinBrazil,tariffisreducedfrom85 to 35% andinMexicofrom50 to25%. .:
Source:"UruguayRoundAgricultural TradeAgreement:Implications for
Philippine Agriculture."Departmentof Agriculture, 1994.DAVID:GATr-UR AND PHILIPPINEAGRICULTURE 147
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By liberalizing agriculturalimports,reducingproductionand trade-
distorting agricultural support programs, and reducing export subsidies in
developed countries, GATT-UR will not only increase demand for agricul-
tural exports but also increase world commodity prices. Thus, export
earnings from agricultural exports will further increase and the price com-
petitiveness of importable commodities in the domestic market will im-
prove. The estimated increases in the world prices of a number of our major
agricultural products are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Projected Increases in World Prices of Selected Commodities






I_ Pork 7 Beef 6
Chicken 2
IExtractedfrom N. Andrew, I. Roberts, and S. Hester, '_l'heUruguay Round
Outcome: Implications for Agricultural and Resource Commodities,"
Outlook 94, 1993.
Changes in Philippine Policies
There is a common belief that the structure of book tariffs and nontariff
trade barriers confers relatively high protection on agriculture. Book tariff
rates are still as high as 50 percent for rice, vegetable oils, chicken, and
many kinds of fruits and fruit juices. Most tariffs on agricultural products148 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
are inthe order of 30 to 40 percent. Those subject to the minimum tariffof
three percent are seeds, breeding animals, selected feedstuffs, and other •
agricultural inputs. Wheat, milk, and other major food products that are not
produced locally in significant quantities are levied relatively low tariffs of
from 10 to 20 percent. Commodities subject to nontariff trade barriers are
rice, corn, sugar, onion, cabbage, potatoes, garlic, seeds, livestock, and
poultry.
With a few exceptions, however, the potential protective effects of those
trade barriers have not or have only been partially realized because agricul-
tural commodities are largely exportable or effectively nontraded. In other
words, those highly restrictive trade barriers were inmany cases not needed
to promote agricultural• growth. Ironically, by overvaluing the domestic
currency, the overall trade protection system had been and continues to be
the main policy instrument that artificially lowers agricultural incentives.
Fears have been widely expressed that the dismantling ofnontarifftrade
barriers will adversely affect the agricultural sector, particularly the small _'
rice and corn farmers. To show that these fears are not justified, Table 3
presents the actual average nominal protection rate (NPR) in 1990 to 1992,
the 1995 tariff set by EO 470, the binding tariffs provided under GATT-UR
for 1995 and 2004, and the tariffs and quantity levels under the minimum
access requirement. The NPR, which is the percentage difference between
•domestic and world prices at our border, is a measure of the impact of
government price intervention policies on domestic prices. It is the equiva-
lent tariff of nontariff trade barriers; thus, the impact of GATT-UR on
agricultural prices may be gleaned from the comparison of theNPRs (based
on current policies) with the tariffs under GATT-UR.
As requested by the Philippine government, rice has been exempted
from the GATT:UR regulations over the next 10 years, although a minimum
access requirement was imposed on the staple. It should be emphasized,
however, that government rice price policy under the National Food Author-
ity (NFA, previously known as the Rice and Corn Administration and later
as theNational Grains Authority) has been historically pro-urban consumer
and antifarmer (Mangahas 1972; David 1983; Unnevehr !983; lntal andTABLE 3
The NominalProtectionRates, CurrentTariff, and GATT BindingTariff <






t 990192 1995 2005 Tariff Quantity(mt) o
"O




Rice 16 50 nc nc 50 59,730 238,940
t'rl
Corn 62 20 100 50 35 130,160 216,940
Sugar 89 50 100 50 50 38,O00 64,000 _0
Chcken 94 30 100 40 35 2,218 3,396
(,_) -_
t-
Pork 31 30 100 40 35 826 1,376 ;o
m
Beef nay 30 60 35 30 15,000 32,000
Gadic 500 30 100 40 nap nap nap
Onions 01 30 100 40 30 1,610 2,683
Potatoes nay 30 100 40 50 1,457 2,429






Power 1991). Table 3 indicates that for 1990 to 1992, NFA monopoly on
trade caused the domestic price of rice to be higher than the world price by
only 16 percent whereas the book tariff rate stood at 50 percent. In fact,
from 1960 to 1990, the domestic price of rice was just more or less equal to
the border price, i.e., the equivalent tariff under NFA monopoly was zero
percent. Evidently, the domestic price of rice would have been higher if
NFA did not exist and that the private sector was allowed simply to export
at 50 percent tariff. Because of the 50 percent tariff, the private sector would
have imported less (if at all) than NFA in the 1980s. Indeed, NFA has a
greater incentive than the private sector to import rice because the former
has always been exempt from tariff duties, enabling it to realize larger
profits (o_ten to pay for higher cost of operations) than the private sector
which has to pay tariffs and thus earn only normal profit margins. Contrary
to popular belief, there is absolutely no reason to think that rice farmers will
be adversely affected by GATlr-UR. To repeat, the rice sector has been
exempted from GATT-UR and the minimum access tariff has been set at
50 percent which is much higher than the historical equivalent tariffresult-
ing from NFA trade monopoly.
GATT-UR will remove NTBs for corn, sugar, livestock and poultry,
garlic, onions, potatoes, and cabbage. But with the exception of garlic, the
initial binding tariff to replace the NTBs for 1995 would be even higher
(often at 100 percent) than the actual protection (NPR) conferred by the
NTBs in 1990-1992 and the tariff rate under EO 470. And even after 10
years, the tariffs under GATr-UR would remain high (ranging from 35 to
50 percent) as compared with the average book tariff rate under EO 470
which is currently about 30 percent. Tariffs on imports under the minimum
access would be lower than the binding tariffs, in the order of 30 to 50
percent. But the minimum access levels would be generally low, at most
three percent of production. Import demand for these affected commodities
at the minimum access tariffs will likely be greater than at the minimum
access level, thus, the operable protective tariff will likely be the binding
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Why Dismantle NTBs?
The excessive protection on a few commodities such as sugar, corn, garlic,
and poultry draws incentives in favor of commodities in which the country
apparently does not possess any comparative advantage in producing,
lowers the profitability of food processing and livestock enterprises due to
higher sugar and corn prices, and increases food prices to final consumers.
The large owners of land and capital, particularly those in sugar and
medium- and large-scale poultry and livestock industries, stand to gain from
such protective policies. Their workers will not benefit as much because
wages are determined by demand and supply conditions in the labor market.
The majority of poor corn farmers grow corn mainly for subsistence and
are thus not significantly affected by price changes. In turn, poor urban
consumers and the vast majority of rural consumers are penalized by higher
food prices because they are net buyers of these products. Thus, the impact
of excessive trade protection on income distribution will likely be adverse.
Aside from the inefficiencies caused by distorted relative prices, the use
of NTBs instead of tariffs (l) introduces unnecessary and costly uncertain-
ties about import policy, particularly on corn; (2) provides economic rents
(i.e., unearned profits) to those that have been granted and those granting
import allocations rather than tariff revenues for the government; and (3)
increases the transaction costs of implementing policy objectives.
Benefits from GATT-UR
GATT-UR will therefore benefit the country in general and the agricultural
sector in particular for the following reasons:
1.Global trade liberalization will generally increase the world
prices of agricultural commodities; consequently, the domestic
prices of exportable and importable agricultural commodities, as
well as net foreign exchange earnings/savings, will increase.
2. Reductions inthe import barriers of our trading partners will
substantially expand the markets for traditional and nontraditional
agricultural exports.152 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
3. Overall trade liberalization in the country will reduce the
degree of overvaluation of the domestic currency, thus raising the
relative prices of agriculture vis-h-vis other goods and services
because most agricultural commodities are tradeable.
4. With the lowering of the excessive protection conferred on
a number of agricultural commodities, a more efficient allocation
of resources within agriculture and across sectors will bepromoted.
This will also improve the consumers' welfare through lower prices
of these commodities and processed food products that use sugar
and corn as major inputs.
5. It will focus government attention on addressing theprob-
lem of declining competitiveness of Philippine agriculture away
from counterproductive and administratively costly trade regula-
tions toward a more efficient provision of support services to the
sector.
Common objections to the GATF-UR provisions on agriculture are
therefore misguided. Why should we continue to confer excessively high
protection on a few agricultural commodities paid for by the general public
to the ultimate detriment of the majority of agricultural producers, particu-
lady poor farmers and landless laborers? To be sure, the rates of protection
are not trivial as shown earlier. For 1990 to 1992, the domestic price of sugar
was about 90 percent above border prices, while that of corn was more than
60 percent, garlic more than 500 percent, and chicken more than 90 percent.
Indeed, the highly restrictive import policy on corn is the main reason why
prices of pork and chicken have risen significantly in recent years. Sugar
has historically been highly protected because of the US quota policy, but
why should the domestic consumers be penalized, further increasing the
bonanza enjoyed by sugar producers, specifically large landowners? The
ban on imports of garlic, onions, potatoes and cabbage was imposed because
of the political clout of the Northern provinces. Chicken'has historically
been highly protected because of the relatively strong lobbying of theDAVID: GA'n'-UR AND PHILIPPINEAGRICULTURE 153
preponderantly large producers in this subsector. The desire for self-suffi-
ciency inthese commodities does not warrant the efficiency and equity cost
of such policies.
Indeed, the government has been overly conservative in reforming the
agriculture-specific trade regulations under GATT-UR. For example-
I. The National Food Authority's international trade monop-
oly on rice will effectively continue because the minimum access
requirement is at a tariff rate (50 percent), far higher than the
historically observed difference between domestic and border
prices. The government will likely decide to import enough rice
(without tariffs) to maintain apolitically acceptable consumer price
before the private sector deems it profitable to import rice at a 50
percent tariff. As pointed out, GATT-UR will not affect the rice
market policy. In other words, the very costly subsidies to NFA
market operations which have not benefited farmers will continue,
diverting scarce government resources that could have been better
spent on productivity-enhancing public support services.
2. Inmost cases, the tariffto be imposed in place ofquantitative
trade barriers will be higher than the equivalent tariffs in the
presence of NTBs. Although the tariffs will decline over 10 years,
they will still be much higher than projected average tariffs by the
year 2000. The relatively low minimum access requirement, i.e.,
the level of imports to be allowed at lower tariffs, will make the
higher equivalent book tariff level operational, providing signifi-
cant economic rents to those allowed to import within the minimum
access level.
I believe that the rationalization of agricultural trade policies should be
accelerated even beyond the GATT-UR agreement. This means adjusting
tariffs for agricultural products to equal the overall average tariffover time
which at present stands at only about 30 percent.154 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
" GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND GATT-UR
Inthe process of trade liberalization there will obviously beadjustment costs
in the short run. Whether the government should assist or not in this
adjustment process and to what extent depends on who bears the cost, how
much is borne, and the cost-effectiveness of alternative assistance pro-
grams. Sugar, poultry, and garlic have already beenvery highly subsidized
by the general public for many decades. Why, then, should they not bear
the burden of adjustment now, particularly since the cost will be borne
mainly by the relatively high income group of landowners and capital
owners?
The livestock and poultry sectors will not be severely affected because
of the trade liberalization in corn. As mentioned earlier, the poor farmers
growing corn for subsistence will not be significantly affected. In any case,
the more cost-effective approach of assisting the widely dispersed landless
workers and small farmers is to proceed swiftly with the policy and
institutional reforms that will improve the country's competitiveness and
• increase employment and economic growth in general.
To counter the imagined negative effects of GATT-UR on agriculture,
the government plans to provide "safety nets" in the process of GATT-UR
implementation by erecting further protectionist measures and earmarking
tariff proceeds from imports of agricultural products under the minimum
access requirements to substantially raise public expenditures for support
services to agriculture. From current discussions on "safety nets," it is
possible that many of these will likely reduce, if not negate, the potentially
positive impact of GATT-UR on the total economy.
The strengthening of agricultural support services must be viewed in
the context of improving the competitiveness of Philippine agriculture and
not as "safety nets" in response to GATT-UR. The main problem of
Philippine agriculture is its declining competitive advantage. Table 4 shows
that from 1980 to 1992, the Philippines had the lowest growth rate of
agricultural gross value added, agricultural exports, and gross domestic
product among developing Asian cotmtries. Declining competitive advan-TABLE 4
Average Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product, Agricultural Value Added, Food Production per Capita, X










Gross Agriculture Food per Agriculture Gross Agriculture Food per Agriculture
domestic gross capita export domestic gross capita export
product value product value --- z
added added m _>
c)
;o
Chinaa 5.7 2.7 1.5 13.1 8.5 5.6 2.7 9.1 _, c
Indonesia 8.4 4.4 1.4 17.5 5.6 2.9 2.1 2.6 __
Malaysia 9.t 6.5 5.1 17.5 6.2 3.4 3.9 1.8 :oC
Thailand 6.7 4.2 b 2.1 20.7 9.9 5.8 0.5 5.2 m
Philippines 6.1 4.9 1.6 14.3 1.5 1.1 -1.4 -3.2
India 3.9 1.8 0.2 14.3 5.6 c 3.8d 1.6 5.1
Pakistan 5.3 3,0 0+5 15.5 6.0 d 4.2d 0,9 1.6
Nepal 2.0 0,8 -0.9 -1.8 4.5 4,6 1.1 -1.0
Bangladesh 4.7 1.4 -1.2 0.1 4.0 2.9 -0.3 -1.5
Sri Lanka 3.7 1.9 1.2 7.8 4.1 1.8 -1.6 -0.4
aRefers to China and Taiwan.
bAverage of 1972-1980.
CData up to 1990 only.
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rage isalso evidenced by the declining share in world markets of practically
all our major agricultural exports since the 1960s in the case of sugar, the
mid- 1970s for coconut products, and the 1980s for bananas and pineapples
(Table 5). With or without GATT-UR, that problem must be vigorously
addressed. The GATT-UR provision on agricultural trade policy itself is
instrumental in improving agriculture's competitiveness as discussed ear-
lier. But unless the other _qually important causes of the sector's declining
competitive advantage (i.e., high cost of transport and limited productivity
growth) are addressed decisively, the Philippine agricultural sector will
continue to lag behind.
The issue therefore is not how to provide safety nets because of
GATT-UR, but rather how to take,advantage of the GATT-UR trade policy
framework to improve the agricultural sector's competitive advantage.
Specifically, the challenge is how to strengthen agricultural support services
to take full advantage of the trading opportunities opened up by the GATT-
UR agreement.
That distinction is Critical in designing the appropriate program of
action in the Sector. As a "safety net," there is a sense of panic, a tendency
to choose short-term rather than more cost-effective, long-term policy and
institutional instruments, and a tendency to focus on the affected industries
rather than on those with the greatest technological and marke t potentials.
The following paragraph s provide some examples.
More Distortions
To allay fears that, with the 100 percent tariff on corn, the livestock and
poultry producers will substitute wheat for corn (something they are already
doing), a complex set of import controls is being proposed to increase the
price of wheat when used as feed. The secretary of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) himself said that wheat istoovaluable to be fed to animals.
Why, then, is corn being made artificially expensive? How can the com-
petitive advantage of livestock and poultry increase when the government
slaps amuch higher tariffon the most important feed ingredient (corn/wheat
feed) compared to output? Indeed, rice itself may become a major feedTABLE5 o
Trends in the Share of Wodd Trade of Selected PhilippineAgricultural Exports, t960-1992 <_
ffl
Coconutproducts 2l






1960-1964 48 54 31 56 34 9 0 -
"O
1965-1969 55 62 47 52 47 7 0 -
m
1970-1974 56 61 53 53 46 7 3 - _>
1975-197963 60 85 61 4 8 18 c
1980-1984 65 38a 68 62 59 4 9 20 r-
-4
C
1985-1989 57 34a 59 51 51 I '/' 15 ;o
m
1990-1992 52 26 59 43 45 1 5 14
aFour-yearaverageonlybecauseofcopraexportban in1984 and.1985.
btncludescentrifugalandrefinedsugar.
CAverage of 1978 and 1979 sinceworldexportdataon pineappleweregatheredbeginning in 1978 only.
Source:CristinaC. David,"EconomicPolicies and Agricultural Incentives:The Philippine Case," paperpresented
at theConferenceonAgricultural ReformsinAsia inthe1980s, Bangkok,FAO,January1995.DAVID:GA'I-r-UR AND PHILIPPINEAGRICULTURE 159
level, timing and quality of imports, both in terms of transaction costs and
quality of decisions. It will also be a more equitable procedure.
Earmarking of tax proceeds for the development of an industry may be
justified ifthe tax is ultimately borne by, and benefits accrue to, the industry.
This isthe case, for example, with a commodity-specific export tax or access
earmarked fbr research and development of an export industry, where the
benefits of technological change typically accrue to producers. It should be
stressed that tariff proceeds from imports under the minimum access
requirements are paid for by tile general public, and it is incumbent up'on
the government to allocate these resources to public sector activities that
have the highest social rates of return. After all, expenditures for well-
designed education and health programs may provide greater benefits to
poor farmers than poorly-designed support services such as government
marketing operations or subsidies to unviable postharvestfacilities. Farm-
ers and especially landless households in rural areas are mobile and not tied
to land. They would benefit most from public expenditures that would raise
their human capacity, increase employment, and accelerate overall eco-
nomic growth in the most economical manner. A committee composed
mainly of representatives from the "affected" sectors cannot be expected
to allocate resources in favor of those commodities with the highest tech-
nological and market potentials or the highest pay-off for society. Inevita-
bly, they will be looking out for their own vested interests.
Administratively determined import allocations and earmarking of tax
proceeds are dangerous precedents that will fragment the budget process,
weaken government accountability, and lead to a misallocation ofresources.
These approaches not only violate principles of good public finance ma-
nagement and promote corruption but are a highly unstable source of
funding for agricultural support services. The world prices and domestic
production of agricultural commodities which largely determine import values
are otten unstable as a consequence of which tariffproceeds are also unstable.
Ideally, agreater and more stable source offunding isnecessary for theefficient
planning and implementation of agricultural support services.160 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Agricultural Support Services
Because of certain unique characteristics of agriculture that cause market
failures, the government has a more pervasive role in providing support
services to the sector to increase productivity, improve market efficiency,
•andprotect the environment compared tothe nonagricultural sectors. None-
theless, public expenditures for those services will still have to be evaluated
on the basis of their social rates of return relative to other types of public
expenditure.
The discussion has so far focused on the level and allocation of
additional budgets in broadterms. There has been no effort to address the
•inefficiencies in the design, priorities, and delivery of agricultural support
programs now being undertaken by DA, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
Weaknesses in the institutional structurelimiting the effective design and
delivery of programs of these agencies have been documented (David et al.
1993); and countless examples of costly programs that did not have any
measurable impact on producers' welfare abound. If those issues are not
addressed,additional resources foragriculture may go to waste again. There
has bgen no indication that the government•will adopt institutional reforms
.to streamline the bureaucracy, abolish ineffective programs, and reallocate
budgets away from government marketing and trade regulations toward
productivity-enhancing investments.
Although no concrete new programs have been proposed, except to
intensify current programs and thrusts, a number of •observations could
nonetheless be made.
!. The importance of improving market infrastructure and
rationalizing transportpolicy is now well-recognized due partly to
DA's initiatives. The DA should continue to allocate some re-
sources while conducting studiesrelated tothis issue, disseminating
the findings of those studies and to try to influence the regional
allocation ofthe market infrastructurebudget.•Itshould be stressed,
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government units are directly responsible for the efficient delivery
of market infrastructure services because a whole range of factors
and sector interests must be taken into account in allocating public
investments for market infrastructure. DA's preoccupation with
market infrastructure issues may have deflected its attention from
addressing the weaknesses of agriculture-specific support services.
2. Too often, proposals to increase expenditures for irrigation,
postharvest facilities, and the like arejustified on the basis of some
perception of a technical need ratherthan on social ratesof returns.
The National Irrigation Administration's estimate of the irrigable
area does not consider the economics of irrigation investments. It
is very doubtful that irrigation investments for corn often men-
tioned by the DA will be socially profitable. Studies have already
shown that even in rice where only 50 percent of the area is
irrigated, there are limited socially profitable opportunities in
greatly expanding gravity irrigation. Some rehabilitation projects,
small communal systems, and institutional reforms to improve
system management may be economically justified. The potentials
for expanding the use of shallow tubewells suitable fora wide range
of high valued crops have not been sufficiently explored. Very little
effort has been devoted for developing property rightsand incentive
structures to ensure the sustainable use of groundwater sources and
complementary support services such as aquifer characterizations,
improvement of drilling techniques, etc., which are activities that
should be the focus of public sector efforts in this area.
3. The plans to heavily support the expansion of postharvest
facilities are also based on the technical observation that posthar-
vest losses are high. It seems that not much thought is being given
tothe economics of alternative ways of reducing postharvest losses
and to the proper roles of the public and private sectors in resolving
that problem. Past government programs to improve facilities for
grain storage, drying, and miIling for ricelanded by the World Bank162 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
and other foreign donors have basically failed. It is also ironic that
the DA is calling for more public money for postharvest facilities
when NFA has substantial excess storage facilities nationwide that
are rapidly deteriorating. The government can undoubtedly contrib-
ute to the minimization of postharvest losses such as in under-
standing their causes, developing and disseminating new
technologies, and analyzing constraints to private sector adoption
of these new technologies and investments in postharvest facilities.
Thus far, there are no indications that the government will not make
the same costly mistakes committed in the past in this area.
4. The misallocation of public resources in what may be con-
sidered "soft" as opposed to "hard" or physical infrastructure is
perhaps even worse. The government still plans to allocate substan-
tial funds for organizing cooperatives to turn farmers into traders
because agricultural trading is "cartelized." That, I think, stems
from a lack of basic understanding of the economic value of
specialization, economies of scale, etc., which leads to an economy
where producers are not necessarily traders. It also stems from a
lack of understanding of the fact that cartels or monopolies are
typically created by government policy. A case that is not well-
recognized is the banana plantation cartel created by the banana
hectarage limitations law which disallows new entrants from estab-
lishing new banana plantations. Increasing budgets for education is
definitely better than expenditures on cooperative movements in
upgrading farmers' capabilities to farm better or engage in trade,
or any nonfarm employment to increase their income. This is not
to say that farmers' cooperatives are not worthwhile, but to empha-
size that government-supported ones tend to fail, as numerous
studies have shown.
5. Emphasis has been too little on technology generation, too
much on technology transfer, and too much on community/coop-
erative organizing. This is in part due to the misconception thatDAVID: GATT-URAND PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURE 163
there are many economically viable new technologies on the shelf
and that technology transfer is the constraint. That is simply not the
case. The Seed Law, fbr example, was passed restricting imports
of seeds which embody new technologies developed abroad despite
the objections of small vegetables growers. Now that the large
growers of cutflowers and nontraditional exports are articulating
the importance of having access to improved seeds and planting
materials wherever they come from, the government's folly in
passing that law in the first place has become obvious.
6. Although increasing public expenditures for agricultural
research and development is being mentioned as a "safety net,"
there is concern that only lipservice is being paid to this effort. The
Philippine budget for agricultural research has declined in real and
in relative terms since the mid-1970s (Figures l and2). In
1981-1985, public expenditure for agricultural research as a ratio
to gross value added in agriculture was only 0.16 percent in the
Philippines compared to 0.46 percent in Thailand, 0.34 percent in
Indonesia, 0.41 percent in developing countries, and 2 percent in
developed countries. The country has fallen behind even more in
the 1990s. We now have one of the lowest budgets for agricultural
research in Asia next to Nepal. Table 6 shows that estimated social
rates of return for agricultural research are extremely much higher
than estimates for infrastructure investments which typically range
from 15 to 25 percent.
7. While a much higher budget for agricultural research is
necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for strengthening the
agricultural research and development system. Unless institutional
reforms that will reorganize the research and development structt, re
are adopted and priority is given to institution building and long-
term research programs, efficiency and effectiveness will be se-
verely constrained. The higher budget will be quickly dissipated by
short-term research projects with questionable pay-off. the prob-FIGURE 1
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8 studies 0 - 20
28 studies 30 - 50
37 studies 50 +
Philippines
Rice (Flores, Evenson and Hayami 1978) 75
Corn (Libreroand Perez 1987) 29 - 48
Sugar (Librero, Perez and Emlano 1987) 51 - 71
Poultry (Librero and Emlano 1990) 100 +
Sources:
R. E. Evenson and C. C. David. "Rice Production and StructuralChange," Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris,1992.
P. Flores, R.E. Evenson, and Y. Hayami. "Social Returns to Rice Research in the
Philippines: Domestic Benefits& Foreign Spill Over." Economic Development
and Cultural Change26, 3 (April 1978).
A. Librero and M. Perez. "Estimating Returnsto Research Investmentin Corn inthe
Philippines;' Philippine Council for Agricultural Resources, Research and
Development (PCARRD), Laguna, 1987.
A. Librero and M. Perez."Estimating Returnsto ResearchInvestmentin Sugarcane
in the Philippines," PCARRD, Laguna, 1987.
A. Librero and M. Emlano. "Estimating Returnsto Research Investmentin Poultry
and Livestock in the Philippines," PCARRD, Laguna, 1988.DAVID: GA'I-F-URAND PHILIPPINEAGRICULTURE 167
lems with the institutional structure of the agricultural research
system and the directions for organizational reforms are discussed
elsewhere (David et al. 1993).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Agriculture isjust one aspect of the GATT-UR. Yet its provisions appear
to be the most controversial. Andjudging from media accounts, ratification
of GATT-UR hinges on the establishment of adequate "safety nets" to
protect farmers (and other "affected" groups) from the expected adverse
impact on their welfare of GATT-UR provisions.
This paper argues that the global and Philippine trade liberalization in
the spirit of GATT-UR will benefit the vast majority of farmers and the
poor. A few, made up mostly of large landowners and capital owners, may
need to increase efficiency or reallocate resources that can afford to shou Ider
the short-term cost of adjustment arising from trade liberalization.
The Senate must therefore speedily ratify GATT-UR to enable the
government to get on with the business of carrying out economic and
institutional reforms necessary to achieve sustainable economic growth.
There is no need to make ratification conditional to the establishment of
"safety nets" nor to postpone this atter GATT-UR has been approved by
the US, Japan, and EU. Why waste more time on debates based Ollwrong
premises?
Of course, unless we strengthen the very weak agricultural support
services that largely caused the sector's declining competitive advantage,
the Philippines will not reap the full potential benefits from trade liberali-
zation and will continue to lag behind other Asian countries. With or without
GATT-UR, that should be done to reverse agriculture's declining competi-
tive advantage. The opportunity cost of not doing so is all the more with
trade liberalization under GATT-UR. While ratification need not be condi-
tional to having a detailed program of strengthening support services, the
agricultural sector must seize the opportunity to obtain Congress' cornmit-
ment in principle to do so.168 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
We propose that a comprehensive assessment of the government's
agriculture-specific support services be made soon. And a detailed program
of action that includes institutional reforms, program formulation, and
budget rationalization should be made before any substantial increases in
the budget for agriculture are approved. That program must be subject not
only to a budget review but to a technical review as well. Highest priority
must be given to the rationalization of the research and development system.
Technological change is the key instrument for increasing agricultural
productivity, thereby enhancing agriculture's competitive advantage.DAVID:GA'I-r-URAND PHILIPPINEAGRICULTURE 169
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ill II
COMMENTS
Thank you for inviting me to comment on the paper of Dr. Cristina David,
a respected economist in the country and our mentor in a major agricultural
policy effort in the 1980s, right after the successful EDSA revolution.
Considering that in this series of talks, we are honoring Dr. Gelia Castillo
for her intellectual legacy that has undoubtedly enriched the field of soci-
ology in the Philippines, I supposed that the best approach in examining the
work ofDr. David is to look at it through the prism of sociology, more
particularly political sociology. It is a truism by now to state that policy-
making or policy-decision is not merely an economic activity. It is usually
a product of intense lobbying and political interaction. Itinvolves not merely
factoring the economic costs and returns to the society but oftentimes its
political and sociological fallouts.
Hilarion "Larry" Henares once disdainfully described economists as
sort of "eunuchs." They know all the theoretical stuffon how to do it, but
cannot consummate it.Larry detects that the problem isthe inability of most
economists to be immersed in the arena of the real world. Call it snobbery
or sheer conservatism, but often, economists, once confronted with the
swelling protests over a recommendation they made, cannot hold their
ground. They would rather prefer playing the role of a policy kibitzer and
let somebody take all the flak for the recommendations they made.
It was sheer exasperation that jolted Dr. Castillo herself to propose in
the past that economists should be held criminally liable for failed recom-
*Delivered beforetheSenatevotedonGATT.172 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
mendations. There is just too much power conferred to them but no
accountability. But to be fair, those who have joined the fray in the real
world situation have become more level-headed, or call it realistic, than
those who opted to be ensconced in the security of their academic research
room.
The reason for this digression is the dilemma which I sense in the paper
of Dr. David. Her simple conclusion is that if we cannot ensure the
institutional reforms in agriculture and agriculture-related agencies of the
government, particularly prioritizing the research and development system,
then no substantial increases in the budget of agriculture should be ap-
proved. For her, it is more efficient to place the extra money in education
than in cooperative development and agriculture per se ifthese institutional
reforms are not pursued.
The recommendation comes at the backdrop of the Senate's delibera-
tion on whether or not to ratify the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Given talks about putting in place the "safety nets" to agriculture
and increasing the allocation to the Department of Agriculture (DA) to
enable it to build these "safety nets", Dr. David's policy prescription has
the effect of saying that our legislators should not accord additional budget
to DA if it is not able to undertake the institutional reforms in the agency
and related agencies that deliver support services to the rural sector.
Realistically, at present, Dr. David's recommendation cannot be imple-
mented and, thus, if we follow her thinking, there should be no budgetary
increases for the DA. Her solution is to put it in education and probably to
SCUs conducting agricultural R&D. Meanwhile, she wants GATT to be
ratified by the Senate who wants for practical and political reasons that
"safety nets" are put in place. Who is going to do this? Certainly, not the
DA because it does not have the money; it might as well be the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports!
Economists are fond of formulating models based on an ideal situation.
Once proven to be functioning, then they begin to factor inthe imperfections
of the real world noting that because the model is found in its barest essence,ADRIANO: COMMENTS 173
then even tile imperfections will most likely not distort tile fundamental
tenets of the model.
Yet, when confronted with the real life situation, there seems to be a
tendency to forget this approach. First thing first. Let us get this treaty
ratified first and move towards the things we want later on. We are not
saying that we forget the long-term goal that we have set our eyes on, but
the expediency of the time dictates to us that we need to handle the
short-term obstacle first. The fact of the matter is that we are still not sure
whether GATT will be ratified by the Senate and we are already imposing
many conditionalities beyond what we can tackle.
Sure, one can argue, GATT or no GATT, these things should have been
done a long time ago. In fact, many more should have been done. The fact
however isthat they were not done and we are confronted with the dilemma
of whether we can pass this single policy instrument that most economists
have been longing for. Should we pass on this opportunity because our
research agenda was not served beforehand?
Having said this, let us now go to some minor details.
On the first and second pages of the paper, tile phrase "tile government
monopoly on international trade has caused domestic price to be much lower
than what this would have been ifthe private sector were allowed to import
at tile existing tariff levels," may be true in the 1970s but no longer holds
valid today as the world price of rice is much lower than itsdomestic price.
The use of the concept border price to measure the rates of protection
for agricultural products as stated on the fourth page is sometimes fraught
with danger because it is notnecessarily a reflection of production effi-
ciency. For instance, border price for corn may reflect tile price of American
corn, but may not necessarily mirror the efficiency of American farmers
because this represents a highly subsidized price or dumped price.
Regarding the "safety nets" provided to what is already perceived as a
highly protected sugar sector, this is but a product of the highly organized
and effective lobbying of the sugar bloc. Thus, the claim that "the govern-
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trade regulations" is not so much of the government's desire but a product
of intense backroom negotiation pursued by lobby groups.
On the NFA (National Food Authority) issue, schemes intended for the
farmers to take over some of its operations like the Project Self-Reliance
have failed. Short of starving it with cash and facing the consequent mass
protest oflaid offNFA employees and possibly another setof protest actions
from the farmer groups, l really don't know what other measures to
undertake to handle the NFA issue properly. There must be a range of
alternatives offered. The ones recommending them should be responsible
for the outcomes so that future views will be tempered by the imperatives
of the real world.
The discussion on tariffs should be made in conjunction with the
exchange rate issue. We can certainly re-examine our position on the tariff
levels every three years. Let them stand as they are now and let us focus our
attention on the ratification of this treaty for the moment.
Dr. David is worried that the "safety nets" will have the effect of
increasing rather than reducing protection. Indeed, the provision of the
"safety nets" must be subordinated to the economic direction O r policy this
country desires to undertake.
There isno quarrel regarding the auctioning of the "minimum access"
products. DA Secretary Roberto Sebastian endorses the idea.
The institutional reforms for the agricultural agencies outlined in the
paper staRRingfrom the eleventh page and the subsequent pages are so
radical that we probably need to have another dictatorial regime in order tO
carry them out. Moreover, more studies on infrastructure will help but the
more important concern is how we can persuade the LGUs to use their
internal revenue allotments (IRAs) for more infrastructure facilities.
There seems to be an assumption that cooperatives get a lot of support
from the government. That is simply not true because the Cooperative
Development Authority only obtained a budget of P90 million this year.
Besides, if we are concerned about the poor, investment in education will
not be sufficient to meet their needs in the meantime that they are starvingADRIANO:COMMENTS 175
to death. In lieu of cooperatives, what is the alternative of Dr. David except
investing in education?
The paper also referred to the restrictiveness of the Seed Law. To put
it in its proper perspective, the audience should be reminded that it was
passed during the incumbency of Mrs. Corazon Aquino. To remedy its
faults, its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated under the
term of Secretary Sebastian were interpreted in a more liberal fashion.
Dr. David bats for the re-organization of R&D institutions engaged in
agricultural research. Too many battles at the same time. !am afraid we are
going to lose the war. As Secretary Sebastian noted, even if you have the
technology, but you do not have irrigation, post harvest facilities and farm.
to market roads, a farmer cannot reallyattain much.Highlights of Discussion
GATT AND THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a complicated
issue. Essentially, its main thrust is to replace quantity restrictions with
tariffs. Some tariffs that are being described in GATT are higher than the
existing tariffs. So if one explains GATT to others in a manner that points
out who are being benefitted, people may then come to understand GATT
in due time.
There seems to be a tendency to stereotype the positions taken by the
contending parties on the GATT. GATT has many dimensions aside from
agriculture like the intellectual property rights and trade-related investment
measures. Of course, these dimensions cannot be separated since GATT is
a single document, and one must either agree or disagree with all of its
provisions. However, even if one has made a stand, it does not mean that
he/she cannot free himself/herself from such stand when a debate is going
on. The test of a true scholar, after all, is when one can suspend his own
judgment to hear others. What seems to be happening is that neither side
really wants to explain to the people who are going to be affected by the
GATT provisions.
it is really difficult to sell the idea of liberalizing a lot of agricultural
commodities, especially to small farmers. However, itwas pointed out that
most exports are produced by big farmers and, thus, agriculture should not
only be equated with small farmers. In the case of the sugar industry which178 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
is one of the most pollutive industries because of its by-products, it can
intensely lobby for its protection since the industry can muster a lot of
resources.
There are conflicting ideas, and it really depends on what one believes
in. The contending parties to the GATT have the same background, but
sometimes they differ in opinion. Therefore, one must not take the views
personally. Discussion such as this should be seen as a way of getting the
message across so that in the process, the public will better understand and
be benefitted by the discussions.
Ineffect, the controversy lies inthe communication between two parties
the pro-GAT]" and the anti-GATT. Public support and awareness of
GATT is essentially a function of communication. And since GATT is one
of the most important issues in the country today, scholars must take this
opportunity tOobjectively communicate the pros and cons of GATT.
The identification and determination of the pool of resources to provide
some "safety nets" for certain sectors dislocated or adversely affected by
the GATT as well as the introduction of technologies are critical in the
•implementation of GATT. One has to look at this issue, though, in terms of
cost to the country. The paper's commentator believes that the cost for a
country is greater if it does not ratify the GATT. Once a country accedes to
GATT, then it would be in a better position to negotiate since it can have
an alliance with those countries who have also acceded to GATT.
So,what's next?.Ifa country liberalizes unilaterally, does this mean that it
is repudiating the GATT? The Philippines is certainly not the most liberal in
terms of its agricultural policies, but other developing countries may be in a
worse position. In agreeing to the GAT[ and instituting adjustment measures,
their agricultural sector might ironically become more overprotected.
A comment was made that one can always lower excessive trade
protection on the agricultural sector if the country feels that this sector is
becoming more protected. But then again, it may be more difficult to
institute the country's own reforms if it has ratified the GATT for it is a
binding document.